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Torts
by Phillip Comer Griffeth*
and Cash V. Morris"
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2012 and May 31, 2013.1 Throughout this survey period, our
appellate courts provided clear recitations of existing tort law, clarified
the application and meaning of statutes and existing lines of cases, and
recognized liability and defenses in cases of first impression.
I.

NEGLIGENCE

In Kesterson v. Jarrett,' the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
Georgia Court of Appeals, which had affirmed a jury verdict in favor of

the defendant medical providers when the State Court of Clarke County
limited a severely injured plaintiffs presence at trial.? In the underlying case, the plaintiffs4 alleged that Kyla Kesterson's medical providers
were negligent in her delivery, causing injury, and as a result she was
unable to control her movements and [was] confined to a special
wheelchair, [had] a feeding tube inserted into her stomach, her airway

* Solo Practitioner, Phillip Comer Griffeth, LLC, Athens, Georgia. Davidson College
(B.A., 1989); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993).

Member, Mercer Law Review (1991-1993); Georgia Survey Editor (1992-1993). Member,
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** Partner in the firm of Mayer & Harper, LLP, Athens, Georgia. Georgia Institute of
Technology (B.S., cum laude, 2003); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., 2007).
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1. For an analysis of Georgia tort law during the prior survey period, see Phillip Comer
Griffeth & Cash V. Morris, Torts, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 64 MERCER L. REV. 287
(2012).

2. 291 Ga. 380, 728 S.E.2d 557 (2012).
3. Id. at 381, 728 S.E.2d at 559; see also Kesterson v. Jarrett, 307 Ga. App. 244, 704
S.E.2d 878 (2010). For a discussion of the 2010 opinion, see Phillip Comer Griffeth & Cash
V. Morris, Torts, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 343, 344-45 (2011).
4. This included the injured minor, Kyla Kesterson, and her parents, Catherine and
Ross. Kesterson, 307 Ga. App. at 244, 704 S.E.2d at 880.
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[had to] be suctioned several times a day, [had] bladder and bowel
dysfunction, [suffered] frequent seizures, [had] severely limited
cognitive function, and she [could not] speak.'
On motion by the defendants at trial, the court bifurcated the case into
a liability and damages phase, limiting Kyla's presence in the liability
phase to voir dire and to when her presence was "essential and relevant
to witness testimony related to medical conditions affecting said child
[that] resulted from alleged negligent acts by one or more [d]efendants,"
with the court reserving the right to remove her if her actions were
distracting, disruptive, or potentially prejudicial to one or more of the
defendants.
In a case of first impression, the court of appeals' held that a party's
right to attend all stages of that party's trial is not absolute, noting
there is "no Georgia case law expounding upon the constitutional or
statutory source of a civil party's qualified right to be present during
trial."8 However, the court found guidance in Helminski v. Ayerst
Laboratories,'wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit ruled that under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution's due process clause,o a constitutional right exists to be
present at trial.n Following Helminski, the court of appeals adopted
a five-part test 1 2 that, when met, allows a trial court to exclude a
plaintiff because "[her] presence is not truly an exercise of . .. her right
to be present, because the plaintiff is incapable of making such a
conscious choice [but rather] functions almost as an exhibit, as a piece
of evidence.""
Finding no precedent or logic for the discretionary exclusion of a party
based on that party's competence, the supreme court, relying on case
law and Georgia's long-held, "deeply rooted" constitutional provision
5. Id. at 245, 704 S.E.2d at 880.
6. Id. at 247, 704 S.E.2d at 881-82.
7. Judge Ellington wrote the opinion with Judge Doyle concurring and Presiding
Judge Andrews concurring in judgment only. Id. at 253, 704 S.E.2d at 886.
8. Id. at 248, 704 S.E.2d at 882-83.
9. 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Helminski, 766 F.2d at 213-14.
12. The test bore on the nature of the plaintiffs injuries; whether the defendants'
liability stemmed from causing the injuries; bias the jury might have for the plaintiff
because of the severity of the injuries; and the plaintiffs ability to understand and
participate in the trial. Kesterson, 307 Ga. App. at 250, 704 S.E.2d at 884.
13. Id.
14. See Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 24-25, 694 S.E.2d 83, 85 (2010); Hampton v.
State, 282 Ga. 490, 491-92, 651 S.E.2d 698, 700-01 (2007); Tift v. Jones, 52 Ga. 538, 542
(1874); Wade v. State, 12 Ga. 25, 29 (1852).
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for self-representation in both civil and criminal cases,"' rejected the
court of appeals adoption of the Helminski balancing test and acknowledged the right of civil litigants to be present throughout the trial of
their cases, regardless of competency or injury 6 Beautiflly put, the
court stated:
Under the law of the land and the ambit of our Constitution, a person
does not sacrifice her "right to prosecute . .. in person . .. that person's

own cause in. . . the courts of this state" just because she is unattractive, or disfigured, or handicapped---even to a much greater extent than
Kyla. The risk of inappropriate sympathy can and must be addressed
through the many other remedies discussed above."
Moreover, the court held that as the "real party in interest," there is a
personal element to being present as it is "the party's life that will be
directly affected by the outcome of the case."'" Acknowledging the
potential for prejudice," the court provided numerous accepted methods
that exist to remedy the potential for prejudice and bias including: (1)
venue change; (2) questions and challenges in voir dire; (3) exclusion of
prejudicial evidence; (4) restrictions on opening statements and closing
arguments; and, most importantly, (5) jury instructions.2 0 The court
made clear, however, that it was not curtailing a trial court's discretion
to remove parties, recognizing that the trial court could "control the
courtroom and ensure the orderly and dignified adjudication of cases."2 '
II.

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Although Georgia is home to the seminal case of Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co.,22 one of the first cases in our union
recognizing an individual's right of privacy and publicity, 23 there has
been no codification of the right of publicity and many questions have
remained regarding pursuing an action for an alleged violation. For this
very reason, pursuant to section 15-2-9 of the Official Code of Georgia

15. Kesterson, 291 Ga. at 384, 728 S.E.2d at 561 (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, pt. XII).
16. Id. at 393-94, 728 S.E.2d at 567.
17. Id. at 390, 728 S.E.2d at 565.
18. Id. at 392, 728 S.E.2d at 566.
19. The court noted that the potential effects of prejudice and bias are present in all
cases and must be dealt with by the trial court. Id. at 386-87, 728 S.E.2d at 563.
20. Id. at 386-88, 728 S.E.2d at 563.
21. Id. at 395, 728 S.E.2d at 568.
22. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
23. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:17 (2d ed.
2003).
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Annotated (O.C.G.A.)," a certified question was presented to the
Georgia Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the
25
Northern District of Georgia in Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC,
pertaining to choice of law, the elements of a plaintiffs right of publicity
claim, and the associated damages.26 The plaintiff in Bullard alleged
that in 2000, when she was fourteen years old, she purposefully exposed
her breasts to two unknown men in a parking lot in Panama City,
Florida, who were videotaping her. She subsequently filed suit for the
humiliation and injury to her feelings and reputation by the unauthorized use by the defendant, MRA Holding, LLC (MRA), of the footage in
its College Girls Gone Wild video series and placement of her image on
the video box that was marketed and sold nationwide. On the video box
displaying her image, the defendant placed the words "Get Educated!"
to block out Bullard's otherwise exposed breasts.
Applying Georgia conflict of laws rules' and the doctrine of lex loci
delicti in tort cases, the court held that substantive Georgia law
governed the right of publicity because the image, although recorded in
Florida, was distributed nationwide, and, thus, the plaintiff would have
suffered the injury in Georgia where she lived and attended school."
Focusing on the plaintiff's misappropriation of likeness claim,ao one of
the four disparate invasion of privacy torts in Georgia,a' the court held
that the elements were: "[11 the appropriation of another's name and
likeness, whether such likeness be a photograph or [other reproduction
of the person's likeness]; [2] without consent; [3] for the financial gain

24. O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9 (2012).
25. 292 Ga. 748, 740 S.E.2d 622 (2013).
26. Id. at 749-50, 740 S.E.2d at 624-25.
27. Id. at 748-49, 740 S.E.2d at 624.
28. Id. at 750, 740 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941) (holding that federal courts apply the conflict of laws rules of forum states in
which they sit)).
29. Id. at 750-51, 740 S.E.2d at 625.
The place where the tort was committed, or, "the locus delicti, is the place where
the injury sustained was suffered rather than the place where the act was
committed, or, as it is sometimes more generally put, it is the place where the last
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."
Id. (quoting Risdon Enters., Inc. v. Colemill Enters., Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902,903,324 S.E.2d
738, 740 (1984) (emphasis added)).
30. Misappropriation of image or likeness is a particular violation of individuals' control
over their images, often referred to as the right of publicity. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr.
for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 140, 296 S.E.2d 697, 701
(1982).
31. Bullard, 292 Ga. at 751, 740 S.E.2d at 626.
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of the appropriator."3 2 The court further held that the cause of action
is equally available to private citizens as well as entertainers.3
Focusing primarily on the lack of consent and the use of the words "Get
Educated!" (which could be perceived as an endorsement by Bullard to
purchase the video), the court reasoned that Bullard had stated a claim
that "[her] image was arguably used without her consent to endorse an
MRA product for MRA's own commercial gain."" Most interestingly,
the court held that the plaintiff's damages were "limited to the actual
damages Bullard incurred from [the defendant's] appropriation of her
image," requiring her to "show that the use of her image actually added
value to MRXs advertising efforts that otherwise would not have existed
without the use of her image."3
III. PREMISEs LIABILITY
During this survey period, the court of appeals continued its analysis
from a line of cases holding that "[p]roof of a fall, without more, does not
create liability on the part of a proprietor or landowner."" In a case
in which the plaintiff "admitted that she did not know what caused her
to fall" and could not "prove that she lacked equal knowledge of the
hazard," the court held that she "had actual knowledge of the floor's
condition at the time of her fall," and because the restaurant had a
"reasonable cleaning [and] inspection procedure, no constructive
knowledge of the floor's condition" could be imputed to the defendant.38
Likewise, in Anderson v. Canup," the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff testified in her deposition, "I
do not remember what happened" and "I'm not sure," and no other
evidence in the record demonstrated the cause of her fall. 0 The court

32. Id. at 752, 740 S.E.2d at 626 (textual alteration in original) (quoting Martin Luther
King, Jr., 250 Ga. at 143, 296 S.E.2d at 703).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 754-55, 740 S.E.2d at 628 ("While it may be difficult for Bullard to prove how
much the use of her specific image versus other images on the cover of the video added
value to MRA's advertising efforts, assuming that she could show such added value from
the use of her image, she would be entitled to recover damages.").
36. El Ranchero Mexican Rest., No. 10, Inc. v. Hiner, 316 Ga. App. 115, 117, 728 S.E.2d
761, 763 (2012) (quoting Pinckney v. Covington Athletic Club & Fitness Ctr., 288 Ga. App.
891, 893, 655 S.E.2d 650, 652-53 (2007)).
37. Id. at 117, 728 S.E.2d at 763.
38. Id. at 118-19, 728 S.E.2d at 764.
39. 317 Ga. App. 558, 731 S.E.2d 786 (2012).
40. Id. at 559-60, 731 S.E.2d at 787-88 (relying also on Willingham Loan & Realty Co.
v. Washington, 311 Ga. App. 535, 716 S.E.2d 585 (2011), discussed in last year's survey);
see also Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 293 nn.44-46.
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of appeals also continued to follow the standard outlined by the Georgia
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Kroger Co.," which often results in
summary judgment for the premises owner.42 However, a few opinions
from this survey period quoted some plaintiff-friendly language from
Robinson.
In Samuels v. CBOCS, Inc.," the court of appeals reversed a grant
of summary judgment for a defendant when the plaintiff slipped and fell
on a "piece of wood approximately four inches long and one-half inch in
diameter"44 (likened to a "Lincoln Log"45), while leaving a Cracker
Barrel restaurant in Perry, Georgia." The court relied on the "reasonable minds can differ" language from Robinson to rule that because the
plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to show that the defendant "failed
to follow its established inspection schedule," an inference was raised
that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the object and there
was a question of fact whether the object could have been seen by the
plaintiff on reasonable inspection.48 Similarly, in Ramotar v. Kroger
Co.," Judge Barnes joined with two of the same judges who decided
Samuels to reverse a grant of summary judgment for a defendant when

41. 268 Ga. 735, 748-49, 493 S.E.2d 403, 414 (1997) (discussed in Griffeth & Morris,
supra note 1, at 294 nn.52-57).
42. See, e.g., Courter v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 317 Ga. App. 229, 231, 730 S.E.2d 493,
495 (2012) (holding that the plaintiffs admissions of awareness of the particular risk could
not show the defendant's "superior knowledge" of the hazard); Kouche v. Farr, 317 Ga. App.
277, 279, 730 S.E.2d 45, 47 (2012) (holding that an invitee who slipped on a driveway had
"equal knowledge of the perilous icy conditions").
43. 319 Ga. App. 421, 742 S.E.2d 141 (2012).
44. Id. at 422, 742 S.E.2d at 142.
45. Id. at 422 n.1, 742 S.E.2d at 142 n.1.
46. Id. at 421, 742 S.E.2d at 142.
47. Id. at 424, 742 S.E.2d at 143.
48. Id. The court distinguished
Brown v. Host/Taco Joint Venture, [305 Ga. App. 248, 251, 699 S.E.2d 439, 443
(2010)] ([the] plaintiff admitted that grease spot on floor was not easily visible and
therefore failed to establish that [the] defendant could have easily seen and
removed grease prior to fall) [discussed in Griffeth & Morris, supranote 3, at 34950 nn.55-58]; Chastainv. Cf Georgia North Dekalb L.P., [256 Ga. App. 802, 80204, 569 S.E.2d 914, 915-17 (2002)] (no evidence reasonable inspection would have
discovered a "two and a half foot line of dribbled water" where [the] plaintiff
testified that the water was not "easily visible"); Lindsey v. Georgia Building
Authority, [235 Ga. App. 718, 720, 509 S.E.2d 749, 750-51 (1998)] (no inference of
constructive knowledge where [the] plaintiff testified that single raised brick on
the edge of the landing "was extremely difficult to see"); [and) Rodriquez v. City
of Augusta, [222 Ga. App. 383, 384, 474 S.E.2d 278, 279 (1996)] ([the] plaintiff
admitted that dangerous substance was not visible to the eye).
Samuels, 319 Ga. App. at 424, 742 S.E.2d at 143.
49. 322 Ga. App. 28, 743 S.E.2d 591 (2013).
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the plaintiff slipped on a puddle of oil at a store in Loganville, Georgia.50

[T]he evidence raised a factual question regarding whether store
employees were in the immediate area of the oil puddle and could have
easily seen it. Moreover, a factual question remain[ed] regarding
whether the oil remained on the floor long enough that Kroger's
employees should have discovered and removed it during a reasonable
inspection. Notably, the evidence showed that Kroger had no set policy
regarding regular inspections, and the store's employees had no specific
time periods during which they regularly inspected the store aisles or
swept [the] floors. Additionally, no evidence showed that any Kroger
employee inspected or checked aisle five for at least [forty-five] minutes
prior to Mr. Ramotar's fall."
Cases often turn on the deposition testimony and affidavits obtained
by the parties prior to summary judgment. For example, in Hayward v.
Kroger Co.,52 summary judgment for the store was affirmed when
Kroger relied on deposition testimony of its store manager, as well as an
affidavit from an assistant manager, to show Kroger's wet-floor policies
The plaintiff sought to
and procedures on the date in question."
introduce affidavits from an expert witness "in risk management for
grocery stores generally," which the State Court of Gwinnett County
refused to consider." However, in Parker v. All American Quality
Foods, Inc.," the court of appeals reversed summary judgment for the
store when the plaintiff "did not fall at the entrance of the store, and
instead . . . 'retriev[ed] a shopping cart and walk[ed] past six checkout

50. Id. at 28-31, 743 S.E.2d at 592, 594.
51. Id. at 31, 743 S.E.2d at 594. Contra H.J. Wings & Things v. Goodman, 320 Ga.
App. 54, 56, 739 S.E.2d 64, 67 (2013) (reversing a denial of summary judgment for the
premises owner on interlocutory appeal, determining the plaintiff did not show "the
existence of a hazardous condition that caused her to fall"). Interestingly, the court in H.J.
Wings & Things qualified in a footnote that although the plaintiff sought to rely on two
depositions to show a hazardous condition, the deposition transcripts were not included in
the appellate record. 320 Ga. App. at 57 n.2, 739 S.E.2d at 68 n.2.
52. 317 Ga. App. 795, 733 S.E.2d 7 (2012).
53. Id. at 795-96, 733 S.E.2d at 9-10.
54. Id. at 797, 733 S.E.2d at 10. The court also construed the "rule of self-contradictory
testimony," see Prophecy Corp. v. CharlesRossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 28, 343 S.E.2d 680,
682 (1986), against the plaintiff to "discount her later testimony to the effect that she did
not know that the floor was wet as she entered the store." Hayward, 317 Ga. App. at 799,
733 S.E.2d at 11. But see Bradley v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 314 Ga. App. 556, 724 S.E.2d
855 (2012), discussed in last year's survey, Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 292-93
nn.41-43, which concerned an erroneous application of the Prophecy Corp. rule.
55. 318 Ga. App. 689, 734 S.E.2d 510 (2012).
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stations' before falling."56 A jury question existed because the store
manager's deposition testimony was inconsistent and the plaintiff "and
his companion both testified that signs were not posted and a mop had
to be brought from the back of the store.""
The availability of video evidence continues to make a significant
difference in a case's outcome, but the appellate courts usually defer to
the trial court's findings on spoliation of evidence. In Kroger Co. v.
Walters," the court of appeals reversed a $2.3 million verdict for the
plaintiff" for a slip and fall on a piece of banana, holding that the
State Court of Gwinnett County abused its discretion in excluding
testimony of the meat department manager, employed with the store for
twenty-five years, who allegedly re-aimed the security camera at issue
in the spoliation sanction; however, the court affirmed the trial court's
finding of spoliation and its remedy of striking the defendant's answer,
remanding the case for a new trial on the issues of causation, the claim
for fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11,6o and damages.6 ' The same panel
of the court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict for the defendant when
the plaintiff claimed error in the trial court's denial of a motion for
sanctions based on the alleged spoliation of video evidence.62 In Powers
v. Southern Family Markets of Eastman, LLC," the court of appeals
rejected the plaintiffs contention "that [the store manager]'s actions in
completing [an] incident report, taking pictures, and drawing a diagram
of the incident scene immediately after the accident demonstrate[d]
that [the store] was anticipating litigation." Practitioners should take
note that the store did not receive a spoliation notice from the plaintiff's
attorney until approximately three months after the incident.6 5
In Landings Ass'n v. Williams,66 the Georgia Supreme Court reversed
the holding of the court of appeals discussed in this survey two years
ago," determining the record showed that the plaintiff "had equal

56. Id. at 691, 734 S.E.2d at 512 (alteration in original) (quoting the trial court).
57. Id. at 692, 734 S.E.2d at 513.
58. 319 Ga. App. 52, 735 S.E.2d 99 (2012).
59. See Griffeth & Morris, supranote 1, at 293 n.49 (discussing, in last year's survey,
the lower court's verdict).
60. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (2010).
61. Walters, 319 Ga. App. at 59-61, 735 S.E.2d at 105-07.
62. Powers v. S. Family Mkts. of Eastman, LLC, 320 Ga. App. 478,478, 740 S.E.2d 214,
216 (2013).
63. 320 Ga. App. 478, 740 S.E.2d 214 (2013).
64. Id. at 480, 740 S.E.2d at 217.
65. Id. at 479, 740 S.E.2d at 216.
66. 291 Ga. 397, 728 S.E.2d 577 (2012).
67. See Griffeth & Morris, supra note 3, at 349.
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knowledge of the threat of alligators within the community."68 Justice
Melton wrote the majority opinion for the supreme court, while
Justices Carley, Hunstein, and Benham filed a dissent, citing a federal
case from Alabama." In a relatively short opinion, the court noted that
the decedent was "aware that wild alligators were present around
[tihe Landings and in the lagoons. Therefore, she had knowledge equal
to [that of] [t]he Landings entities about the presence of alligators in the
community."" Further, she "either knowingly assumed the risks of
walking in areas inhabited by wild alligators or failed to exercise
ordinary care by doing so.""
When the case returned to the court of appeals," the entire court
issued a somewhat fractured ruling reversing the State Court of
The court necessarily vacated its decision,"
Chatham County."
court's
judgment the judgment of the court of
making the supreme
appeals, but reaffirmed its holdings in Divisions 2, 3, and 4 of its
previous opinion. Thus,
[wlhere there is evidence from which a jury could find that the
defendant should have anticipated the presence of the wild animal and
that it was reasonably foreseeable that its presence would render the
premises unsafe for visitors, the defendant will not be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law purely on the basis of the doctrine of
animals ferae naturae."

The plaintiff's complaint did not adequately state a claim for nuisance,
and it remains to be seen whether the trial court will consider the
depositions of certain experts, as that division of the court's previous
opinion was not vacated."

68. 291 Ga. at 397, 728 S.E.2d at 579.
69. Id. at 397, 400, 728 S.E.2d at 579, 580.
70. Id. at 401 n.4, 402, 728 S.E.2d at 581 n.4, 581-82 (Benham, J., dissenting) (citing
George v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 1524, 1535 (M.D. Ala. 1990) to support the
proposition that "[the] appellant knew there were alligators in a recreational swimming
pond did not mean [the] appellant was aware of the eleven-foot alligator that attacked
him").
71. Id. at 399, 728 S.E.2d at 580 (majority opinion).
72. Id.
73. Landings Ass'n v. Williams, 318 Ga. App. 760, 736 S.E.2d 140 (2012).
74. Id. at 762, 736 S.E.2d at 142.
75. See Landings Ass'n v. Williams, 309 Ga. App. 321, 711 S.E.2d 294 (2011), vacated,
318 Ga. App. 760, 736 S.E.2d 140 (2012).
76. Landings Ass'n, 318 Ga. App. at 761-62, 736 S.E.2d at 141-42.
77. Id. at 761, 736 S.E.2d at 141 (emphasis added for style).
78. Id. at 761-62, 736 S.E.2d at 141.
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Chief Judge Ellington wrote the court of appeals opinion with Judges
Barnes, Phipps, and Miller concurring." Judges Doyle, Andrews, and
McFadden concurred specially.so Judge Andrews "disagreeld] with the
... majority opinion to the extent ... Division 2 of [the] prior decision
.

.

. establishes the binding law of the case or law of the State of Georgia

regarding . . . the doctrine of animals ferae naturae."" Judge McFadden "agree[d] with Judge Andrews that Division 2 ... [was rendered]
dicta. But, as [he had] concurred fully in [the] prior majority opinion
and as the Supreme Court did not address the analysis in Division 2 ...
[he] continue[d] to agree with that analysis."12 Thus, practitioners
dealing with future wild animal attacks may not have seen the end of
the court's application of this doctrine.
IV.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

In the medical malpractice arena, the appellate courts continue to
provide guidance where practitioners may perceive ambiguity in
statutory construction and in application.13 In Dailey v. Abdul-Samed,* the court of appeals held that merely being in the emergency room
awaiting a transfer to a receiving hospital for hand surgery, following an
initial consultation, does not automatically invoke O.C.G.A. § 51-129.5(c)'s0 application of the heightened clear and convincing standard
of proof for the plaintiff, and the lowered gross negligence standard of
care for the defendants.86 Interestingly, this opinion was written by
Presiding Judge Miller, with Judge Branch concurring in judgment
only,87 and Judge Ray specially concurring to state that he disagreed

79. Id. at 760, 762, 736 S.E.2d at 140, 142.
80. Id. at 762, 736 S.E.2d at 142.
81. Id. at 763, 736 S.E.2d at 142 (Andrews, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added
for style).
82. Id. (McFadden, J., concurring specially).
83. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 663,663-64,
739 S.E.2d 392, 393-94 (2013) (noting that internal medicine and pediatric residency
rotations through emergency departments for four of the last five years were not "engaged
in the active practice of emergency pediatric medicine" for medical malpractice complaint
affidavit qualification); Bacon Cnty. Hosp. & Health Sys. v. Whitley, 319 Ga. App. 545, 550,
737 S.E.2d 328, 332 (2013) (holding that a chiropractor is not in the same profession as a
physical therapist and therefore not qualified to give expert testimony or an affidavit
regarding alleged negligence); Postell v. Hankla, 317 Ga. App. 86, 87, 89, 728 S.E.2d 886,
888-89 (2012) (holding that the defense's expert medical doctor who did not teach midwives
was not competent to testify as to a midwife's standard of care).
84. 319 Ga. App. 380, 736 S.E.2d 142 (2012).
85. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2000 & Supp. 2013).
86. Dailey, 319 Ga. App. at 386, 736 S.E.2d at 146.
87. Id.
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that any question of fact remained as to the application of O.C.G.A. § 511-29.5(c)."
Regarding the statute of limitations for foreign objects left in a
patient's body," Norred v. Teaver9 0 provides practitioners with a
bright-line rule, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-72. Overruling a prior line
of cases that required an unintentional leaving behind of a foreign
object, the court held that, pursuant to the plain language of the statute,
"the limitation period begins to run upon the discovery of an object not
originating in the person's body that is caused or allowed to remain in
the body," regardless of whether the object was left intentionally or
unintentionally."
V.

CONCLUSION

As suggested in this survey two years ago,92 the effects of legislative
"tort reform" continue to surface in the opinions of our appellate
courts." However, the most interesting cases are those that address
issues of first impression. Divisions among the different panels of the
court of appeals continue to evolve, even outside of the civil context,"
and will perhaps become even more interesting as the newest members
of the courts author more opinions.

88. Id. at 386, 736 S.E.2d at 147 (Ray, J., concurring specially).
89. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-72 (2007).
90. 320 Ga. App. 508, 740 S.E.2d 251 (2013).
91. Id. at 512-13, 740 S.E.2d at 253-54. For a thorough review of the five-year medical
malpractice statute of repose under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71, see Macfarlan v. Atlanta
GastroenterologyAssociates, Inc., 317 Ga. App. 887, 891, 732 S.E.2d 292, 296 (2012).
92. See Griffeth & Morris, supra note 3, at 358.
93. See, e.g., Hickory Lake, L.P. v. A. W., 320 Ga. App. 389, 739 S.E.2d 836 (2013); Six
Flags Over Ga. II, L.P. v. Martin, 320 Ga. App. 52, 743 S.E.2d 25 (2013); Accor N. Am., Inc.
v. Todd, 318 Ga. App. 317, 733 S.E.2d 846 (2012) (all interpreting Couch v. Red Roof Inns,
Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012)).
Of particular note, the decision in Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P. reversed the State
Court of Cobb County's granting of the plaintiffs motion in limine to prevent the
defendants from seeking an apportionment of the damages. 320 Ga. App. at 52, 743 S.E.2d
at 25. However, in a subsequent verdict for the plaintiff, the Cobb County jury apportioned
92% of the $35 million award to Six Flags Over Georgia. Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Six
FlagsHit Hard By Verdict, FULTON CNTY. DAiLY REPORT, Nov. 28, 2013, at 1. The four

attackers, who were employees at Six Flags, received the remaining eight percent. Id.
94. See Alyson M. Palmer, 4-3 Splits On Police Stops Spur Calls For Review, FULTON
CNTY. DAILY REPORT, Aug. 8, 2013, at 1.

